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Abstract
Despite many examples to the contrary, most models of elections assume that rules
determining the winner will be followed. We present a model where elections are solely
a public signal of the incumbent popularity, and citizens can protests against leaders
that do not step down from power. In this minimal setup, rule-based alternation of
power as well as “semi-democratic” alternation of power independent of electoral rules
can both arise in equilibrium. Compliance with electoral rules requires there to be
multiple equilibria in the protest game, where the electoral rule serves as a focal point
spurring protest against losers that do not step down voluntarily. Such multiplicity is
possible when elections are informative and citizens not too polarized. Extensions to
the model are consistent with the facts that protests often center around accusations
of electoral fraud and that in the democratic case turnover is peaceful while semi-
democratic turnover often requires citizens to actually take to the streets.
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1 Introduction
Why do incumbent politicians ever cede office voluntarily? After all, most models of
voting begin with the assumption of that politicians are office seeking, so why do we then
assume that these same actors will simply give up power because of an election result? Of
course, we know incumbents often do give up power after elections, as George H.W. Bush,
Nicholas Sarkozy, Slobodan Milosevic and Eduard Shevardnaze can readily attest. However,
most models tend to separate the mechanism by which the former two relinquished power
(voluntarily after losing an election) from the latter two (at the behest of protesters in the
street following fraudulent elections that they or their party ostensibly won). Highlighting the
importance of this distinction, when Shevardnaze’s successor Mikheil Saakashvili admitted
defeat for his party following Georgia’s 2012 parliamentary election, it was hailed as the first
democratic transfer of power in the Caucasus.
In this paper, we present a single model that encompasses both of these types of incum-
bent turnover. To do so, we treat elections not as a binding contract, but solely as a public
signal of incumbent popularity. The signal – which contains noise from multiple sources and
can include manipulation via electoral fraud – is observed by citizens and the incumbent,
who then decides whether to stay in office or relinquish power voluntarily. If not, citizens
then have the opportunity to take to the streets to try to force the incumbent to step down.
Our main result is that – despite the minimal role assigned to the election – both rule
based (or democratic) alternation in power and non-rule-based (or semi-democratic) alterna-
tion of power can all arise in equilibrium from the same model. By rule-based alternations in
power, we are referring to cases in which the incumbent stays in power only if a formal elec-
toral threshold is reached. However, this is not because the incumbent inherently respects
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the rule, but because such behavior emerges endogenously in equilibrium. This is possible
when citizens can choose between multiple equilibria for some election results, one with a
“high-protest” strategy and another with a “low-protest” strategy. While playing the high
protest strategy and inducing the incumbent to step down if and only if the election result is
above the legal threshold is not the only equilibrium that could be chosen, it is a convenient
focal point for selecting among multiple equilibria. Moreover, if a codified legal threshold
(e.g., 50% of the vote) acts as a focal point determining when citizens play the high protest
strategy, then the elections can appear democratic: a candidate who “loses” the election (i.e.,
receives a share of the vote below 50%) will cede power without protest.1 A key finding from
our model is that these rule-based alternations in power tends to be possible when elections
are very informative and citizens not too polarized.
When these conditions do not hold, there is a unique equilibrium in the protest stage,
which precludes the focal point effect required for rule-based alternation. Still, the incumbent
may step down in this case if the anticipated level of protest is sufficiently high, and this
will tend to happen when a lower than expected election result generates public information
that citizens are unhappy with the regime. That is, the incumbent may step down if the
election result is below a critical threshold, but in a “non-rule based” manner as this critical
threshold need not correspond to a legally defined electoral rule. Intuitively, this can describe
a situation in which an election is held, an incumbent announces that she has indeed cleared
the legal threshold for re-election, protest ensues, and the incumbent ends up stepping down
despite a “winning” election result. We can think of this as a form of turnover in “semi-
democratic” systems: elections are held, but turnover is neither ensured nor prohibited based
on the announced result of the election. Instead the key determinant of turnover is whether
citizens take to the streets following an election or whether, anticipating that citizens will
1Of course, compliance with electoral rules is not a sufficient condition for democracy, but it is certainly
necessary and arguably the most important requirement beyond holding elections in the first place.
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take to the streets (or continue protesting), the incumbent steps down.
In addition, we present two extensions of the model which generate results consistent
with important features of post-election protest. First, we incorporate uncertainty about
how much fraud was committed, but give citizens a public signal of the level of fraud, which
could correspond to media coverage or reports from international monitoring groups. Signals
indicating high levels of fraud make citizens more apt to take to the streets, consistent with
observed behavior. Second, we allow the incumbent to step down either before or after the
protest. In the democratic equilibrium, and losers are sure to face high protest if the do not
yield and hence step down right away. However, in the equilibrium with semi-democratic
turnover, the incumbent tends to be more uncertain about how much protest there will be
and will often “wait things out”, only stepping down if the protest is in fact large. This
distinction is consistent with the fact that democratic turnover tends to be peaceful while
semi-democratic turnover often requires citizens to actually take to the streets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related work.
Section 3 provides a basic overview of the model. Section 4 analyzes the unique equilibrium
case, and Section 5 the multiple equilibrium case. Sections 6 and 7 present the extensions
incorporating uncertainty about the level of fraud and the option to step down before or
after protest, and section 8 concludes.
2 Past Work
The possibility or realization of leaders relinquishing power following an election plays a
central role in prominent theoretical and operational definitions of democracy (Przeworski,
1991; Przeworski et al., 2000; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). However, most formal
theories of democratization do not emphasize alternation of power, but decisions such as
expanding the franchise (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith,
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2009) or the decision to hold elections (Cox, 2009; Little, 2011b). Models that do consider the
decision to step down from office implicitly rely on equilibrium selection for the enforcement
of electoral rules (Przeworski, 2005; Fearon, 2011), whereas here we focus on the existence
of multiple equilibria explicitly.
Our model builds on recent work that analyzes various aspects of elections by treating
them as public signals (Londregan and Vindigni, 2006; Cox, 2009; Egorov and Sonin, 2011;
Little, 2011b, 2012).2 Several recent models examine post-election protest in an informational
framework (Kuhn, 2012; Svolik and Chernykh, 2012; Rozenas, 2012), but treat the opposition
and/or citizenry as a unitary actor, abstracting away from the coordination problem central
to our argument.
Egorov and Sonin (2011) and Little (2012) begin with the same premise as we do here –
where an election result is a public signal in an incomplete information coordination game
– but only focus on the unique equilibrium case and do not allow the incumbent to step
down to avoid protest, and hence there is little overlap with our main results. Models with
incomplete information and coordination – generally called “global games” – are becoming
common in the study of political phenomena such as riots (Atkeson, 2000) and revolutions
(Bueno De Mesquita, 2010; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011).3
Modeling the post-election strategic interaction with a global game is particularly valu-
able in our setting because such games may or may not have multiple equilibria, and it is
2We do not explicitly model why incumbent regimes invite monitoring (Kelley, 2008; Hyde, 2012; Little,
2011a), choose a particular level of fraud (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2009; Simpser, 2011; Little, 2011a), or
hold elections or set up legislatures in the first place (Geddes, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Little, 2011b; Gehlbach
and Keefer, 2011), as these questions have been addressed elsewhere. Further, fraudulent elections with
monitoring are so pervasive in contemporary countries that we are not losing many examples by considering
a model where elections occur that simultaneously feature both fraud and some sort of election monitoring
(Magaloni and Kricheli, 2009; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Simpser, 2011; Hyde, 2012).
3There is no commonly accepted technical definition for what constitutes a global game. To point to a
common reference, the payoff structure of our model meets the listed assumptions in section 2.2.1 of Morris
and Shin (2003), but given the prior and election result citizens do not have a laplacian belief about the
incumbent popularity before receiving their private signal. In fact, this public information is precisely the
reason why we do not always obtain uniqueness unlike the main result in that section.
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generally straightforward to derive conditions under which there are multiple equilibria. In
particular, we argue that coordination and multiple equilibria are central to understanding
why electoral rules can be enforced by equilibrium behavior, a point made by various authors
about the rule of law in general (Calvert, 1995; Weingast, 1997; Mailath, Morris and Postle-
waite, 2001; Hardin, 2003; Myerson, 2008).4 Thus the model here is the first along these lines
to consider a game that sometimes has a unique equilibrium, with a focus on when multiple
equilibria are present and hence when particular rules (in our context, electoral rules) are
enforceable.
The relationship between elections, electoral fraud, and protest has been the focus of a
good deal of scholarly interest following the run of “colored revolutions” in post-communist
countries over the last decade (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). In particular, Tucker (2007) illus-
trates how electoral fraud can be a potent focal point for solving collective action problems
among citizens living under abusive regimes, thus helping to justify our focus in this model
on post-election protests.5 Moreover, in comparative assessments of the factors that lead to
successful colored revolutions, multiple authors highlight the importance of election results as
either galvanizing or deflating an opposition movement (McFaul, 2005; Bunce and Wolchik,
2011). Even more recently, the reaction of the Russian opposition to Putin’s unexpectedly
strong election results in 2012 (as opposed to weaker results in the 2011 parliamentary elec-
tions from the ruling United Russia party) has been noted by academic bloggers as having
a potential deflationary effect on the nascent Russian opposition movement.6
4Little (2011b) argues for the importance of multiple equilibria in understanding consolidated democracy,
but takes the multiplicity as a given and treats noncompetitive elections and elections resembling consolidated
democracy in different models.
5Meirowitz and Tucker (2013) add a dynamic element to this approach, but they model the protester as
a single agent and not as a collective of agents as we do here.
6http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/03/05/russia-2012-presidential-election-post-election-report/
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3 The Model
The actors in the model are an incumbent denoted I, and N citizens, indexed by j.7
Notation referring to the incumbent will often have a superscript I, and notation for the
citizens will generally have a superscript C. We analyze the model for a finite but arbitrarily
large number of citizens, i.e., as N → ∞. Practically speaking, even large post-election
protests only include a small fraction of the total population, so the citizens modeled here
are better conceptualized as those that could plausibly protest.8
The sequence of moves is:
Nature selects incumbent
popularity ω ∈ R
Citizens observe
private signal θj = ω + νj
All observe
e = ω + x+ νe
Incumbent yields
or stands firm
If stand firm,
citizens choose
aj ∈ {0, 1}
We break down a citizen’s support for (or approval of) a current leader/government into
two factors: the average assessment of the “performance” of the leader – analogous to an
approval rating in a public opinion poll – and an idiosyncratic component capturing whether
or not that particular individual likes the leader more or less than average. Thus we model
each citizen as having a personal level of regime sentiment θj, which is written as the average
incumbent popularity, denoted ω, plus an idiosyncratic term that varies by citizen (νj). As
formalized below, citizens with negative or anti-regime sentiment (θj < 0) will generally
want to protest to force the leader to step down if necessary, while those with positive or
pro-regime sentiment (θj > 0) will not want to protest against the regime. As citizens only
7We could also think of this group of citizens as a collection of elites who have the power to oust the
regime or bring other citizens (followers) out into the street. For the sake of clarity, however, we refer to
these people simply as citizens.
8Consider for example the recent Russian post-election protests of 2011-12. Even if we accept the high
end of estimates for the number of Russians who participated in these protests at between 250,000-300,000
people, that is still less than 1% of the population of a country with over 140 million people.
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directly observe their own regime sentiment, we will often refer to θj as citizen j’s private
signal. At the beginning of the game, all actors share a common prior belief about the
average popularity (specified below).
The election result (e) is simply a public signal of the average popularity (ω). The result
is contaminated by fraud (should it occur), denoted x, and random noise νe. The random
component accounts for any factors that might affect the election result independent of
incumbent popularity and electoral fraud, e.g., uncertainty over how closely those turning
out to vote resemble the population at large (or the potential protesters). For now, the
amount of fraud x is fixed and known; an extension will examine uncertainty about the
amount of fraud. Assume the final result takes an additive form: e = ω + x+ νe.
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After observing the election result, the incumbent then chooses whether to step down.
The incumbent makes this decision regardless of whether or not she “wins” the election.10
In fact, a major feature of the model is that we do not assume any notion of winning into
the payoffs or any other aspect of the model; the election is simply a signal of incumbent
popularity, and a noisy one at that. If the incumbent does not step down, the citizens decide
whether or not to protest. Let aj denote the decision to protest or not for citizen j, where
aj = 1 means protesting and aj = 0 not protesting. Denote the proportion of protesting
citizens with ρ ≡∑Nj=1 aj/N .
The incumbent payoff is:
uI(ρ) =

yI if stepping down
1− ρ otherwise
9An unsatisfying aspect of this specification is that the election result can be any real number, as opposed
to representing something more concrete like the incumbent vote share on [0, 1]. However, all of the analysis
here would apply (with clunkier notation) should the citizens instead observe a vote share s(e) where s :
R→ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing function.
10We refer to the incumbent with the pronoun “she” and citizens with “he.”
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That is, yI is the incumbent’s payoff for yielding; if she does not yield, she instead gets
a payoff that is linearly decreasing in the size of protests.11 Assume 0 < yI < 1, so there are
some levels of protest where the incumbent prefers to step down and some where she prefers
to stand firm.
We see citizens as having the following traits. First, they want a high level of protest
against unpopular leaders (i.e., they want to see these leaders out of office). Second, they are
more likely to join these protests the more people they believe will take part, both because
of the information conveyed by larger numbers of protesters (i.e., that the incumbent is less
popular) and because the cost to joining a larger protest is lower. Third, citizens also enjoy
protesting (i.e., get an “expressive” payoff) against leaders that they personally dislike.
Finally, we assume that citizens are uncertain about how much other citizens dislike the
regime and hence their propensity to protest. It is against this backdrop of uncertainty that
the election result provides information about the beliefs of others by providing a signal of
incumbent popularity. Formally, then, the citizen payoffs are:12
uC(aj; θj, ρ, ω) =

yC incumbent steps down
v(ω)(1− ρ) incumbent stands firm and aj = 0
v(ω)(1− ρ)− c− k1(1− ρ)− bθj incumbent stands firm and aj = 1
If the incumbent steps down the game ends, and all citizens get a “yielding” payoff yC .
If the incumbent does not step down, citizens get a partial payoff of v(ω)(1−ρ) regardless of
the action taken, where v(ω) is increasing in ω and can be positive or negative. This captures
11Here and throughout the paper we use “linear” when “affine” would be more precise. That is, for the
incumbent utility as a function of ρ to be linear in the strict sense it would need to be the case that uI(0) = 0,
which is not true.
12Some important aspects of protest that we abstract from include the role of opposition elites’ strategies
(Bunce and Wolchik, 2011), how events other than elections can signal incumbent popularity (Tucker, 2007)
or the possibility of learning across successive rounds of protest in a single country (Meirowitz and Tucker,
2013) or cross nationally (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Ash, 1999).
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the assumption that all citizens want there to be high level of protest when the incumbent
popularity is low (v(ω) < 0) and want there to be a low level of protest when the incumbent
popularity is high (v(ω) > 0). This does not affect the equilibrium strategies when N →∞,
as the individual citizen’s effect on ρ becomes negligible. However, this term will play an
important role in the analysis of why a majoritarian electoral rule – when possible – may be
a particularly good equilibrium for the citizens.
The c > 0 term is a fixed cost of protest independent of how many citizens join. That
is, c is intended to reflect costs such as lost wages or the discomfort of standing in the cold.
The k1(1 − ρ) term is a variable cost term, which captures the idea that it is safer to join
a larger protest. For example, Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria reportedly ordered snipers to
shoot 10 participants per protest in the recent uprising; with this number fixed increasing
the denominator made coming out to the streets less dangerous.13
Finally, citizens get an “expressive” benefit of protest equal to their regime sentiment
multiplied by a negative constant −b < 0. When θj is negative – i.e., citizen j dislikes the
regime – this payoff is positive and hence all else equal citizen j wants to protest, when
θj is positive he prefers to not protest. As high values of b have a multiplicative effect
on underlying differences in how much citizens like or dislike the incumbent – or, loosely
speaking, how much they dislike the incumbent relative to opposition parties – a useful way
to think about this parameter is that it captures how polarized society is.
We include this somewhat nonstandard expressive payoff for a combination of technical
and substantive reasons. Technically, the possibility of a unique equilibrium relies on “two-
sided limit dominance”: i.e., citizens who sufficiently dislike the regime always protest and
those who sufficiently like the regime never protest. A more common way to attain this prop-
erty is for citizens receiving extreme signals to be certain that the protest will “succeed” by
13See http://www.juancole.com/2012/08/the-age-of-mass-killing-comes-to-syria-france-pushes-govt-in-
exile.html
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reaching some critical mass even if none of the citizens modeled themselves join.14 However,
in the context of protesting after an election, we find it less intuitively plausible that citizens
with extreme anti-regime beliefs protest because they think the regime is inevitably going
to fall rather than because they are simply extremely unhappy with the regime and willing
to take a costly action in pursuit of bringing down the regime.
We solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with some additional common restrictions elab-
orated below. Relying on sequential rationality, we first we solve the “protest stage” that
occurs if the incumbent does not step down, and then determine when the incumbent steps
down.15
The Protest Stage
Formally, the citizen strategy is a mapping from the election result and her private signal
(i.e., personal anti-regime sentiment) to the decision to protest or not. As is standard, we
assume at the outset that citizens use a symmetric strategy of the natural form “protest if
and only if θj < θˆ(e)”; i.e., if and only if their personal distaste for the regime is sufficiently
strong. Crucially, this threshold of distaste may be affected by the election result.
When decided whether to take to the streets, each citizen is uncertain about ρ: as the
other citizens’ regime preferences (θj’s) are private, he does not know how many others
dislike the regime enough to protest. Given the linearity of citizen payoffs, the protest
decision depends only on the expected proportion of protesters; we denote this as E[ρ|·]. As
N → ∞, this proportion is unaffected by individual decisions, i.e., limN→∞ E[ρ|aj = 1, ·] =
14Bueno De Mesquita (2011) uses a different payoff structure where uncertainty about payoffs – as used
here – only results in one-sided limit dominance. This is not because the uncertainty is about payoffs per
se, but because no signal gives payoffs that give a dominant strategy to participate (protest) as it can here.
15As the incumbent has no private information, citizens do not make inferences about her popularity from
her decision.
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limN→∞ E[ρ|aj = 0, ·].16 So as N →∞ citizen j protests in equilibrium if and only if:
v(ω)(1− E[ρ|·]) ≤ v(ω)(1− E[ρ|·])− c− k1(1− E[ρ|·])− bθj
θj ≤ −k1 − c+ k1E[ρ|·]
b
(1)
Since the expected level of protest must be between 0 and 1, we can place bounds on the
RHS of equation 1. So, citizens that sufficiently dislike the regime (θj ≤ −k1−cb ) have a
dominant strategy to protest and those that sufficiently like the regime (θj ≥ −cb ) have a
dominant strategy to not protest. That is, some citizens who will protest and some who will
not protest regardless of their conjecture about what others will do.17
For those observing signals that do not give a dominant strategy, the optimal protest
decision depends on the belief about how many other citizens are going to protest. This re-
quires additional assumptions on the distributions of the incumbent popularity and the noise
terms. To greatly simplify the analysis, we make the following distributional assumptions:
1. the incumbent popularity (ω) is normally distributed with mean µ0 and precision τ0
(that is, variance 1/τ0),
2. the noise term in the election result (νe) is normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision τe,
3. the noise terms in the private signals (νj’s) is normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision τθ, and
4. all of the primitive random variables (ω, νe, and the νj’s) are independent.
18
16In other words, no citizens are “pivotal” in the outcome of the protest, see Smith, LaGatta and Bueno
de Mesquita (2011) for a related model with more emphasis on pivotality.
17This holds even if the expressive component of the utility function is arbitrarily small (i.e., for any b > 0).
18The assumption that the idiosyncratic component to the private signals (νj ’s) is independent across
individuals is potentially problematic. We might expect that these signals would be more strongly correlated
among citizens that are “close” to each other, either geographically (especially when there is a strong regional
component to politics, such as in Ukraine) or through social ties (e.g., some candidates may be more popular
among adherents of particular religions); see Dahleh et al. (2012) for a global games model incorporating
such social networks of information exchange. Still, we do not see how a more complicated information
structure would change our main conclusions, and hence proceed with the more tractable formulation.
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The equilibrium condition is that when all other citizens use cutoff rule θˆ(e), a citizen
observing a private signal equal to the cutoff rule – or, the marginal citizen – believes the
expected proportion of protesters is just large enough to make them indifferent between
protesting and not. Citizens observing a lower signal will get a higher expressive payoff for
protest and believe that more citizens are going to protest, making protest optimal. Citizens
observing a higher private signal will get a lower expressive payoff from protest and believe
that fewer citizens will protest, making not protesting optimal. As derived in the appendix,
the cutoff rule as a function of the election result ˆθ(e) must meet the following indifference
condition:
bθˆ(e) + c+ k1
k1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indifference Protest Level
= Φ
(
(τ0 + τe)θˆ(e)− τ0µ0 − τe(e− x)
τ˜−1/2(τ0 + τe + τθ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Protest Level
(2)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative density function (CDF) of a standard normal random variable
and τ˜ is a function of the primitive τ terms, defined in the appendix. The RHS of equation
2 represents the expected proportion of protesters for the marginal citizen with regime senti-
ment θj = θˆ(e). This is increasing in θˆ(e) because higher thresholds mean citizens are more
apt to protest. The LHS of equation 2 represents the expected level of protest required to
make the marginal citizen indifferent between protesting and not. This is also increasing in
θˆ(e), as increasing the threshold means the marginal citizen likes the regime more (or dislikes
the regime less). As elaborated below, for each election result there will be exactly one or
three θˆ(e) satisfying this condition and hence either a unique equilibrium or three potential
equilibria. We first analyze the unique equilibrium case.
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4 The Unique Equilibrium Case and Semi-Democratic Turnover
The size of protest as a function of the election result and other parameters has some
intuitive comparative statics:
Proposition 1. When there is a unique equilibrium in the protest stage, the size of protest
conditional on the election result (E[ρ|e]) is:
i) decreasing in the cost of protesting against the incumbent (c and k1), and
ii) decreasing in the election result (e)
Proof See the appendix.
Increasing the cost of protest (c or k1) has two effects. First, from the perspective of
an individual citizen, increasing the cost terms for a fixed expected level of protest makes
joining the protest less appealing. Second, knowing that other citizens experience the same
higher cost means that they too are less likely to protest. This in turn decreases any given
individual’s expectation about the overall level of protest, making one’s own participation
in the protest less favorable for reasons discussed previously.19
The election result similarly has two effects. From the perspective of the incumbent (and
analyst), lower election results indicate that the incumbent is less popular, and hence for
a fixed citizen strategy more dislike the regime enough to protest. As the citizens observe
the election result as well and expect more of their peers will protest, this leads to a higher
willingness to protest. Note that both of these effects are entirely informational: the election
result doesn’t directly affect payoffs but provides information about what others are apt to
do, potentially having a large affect on equilibrium behavior.
We now turn to the incumbent the incumbent decision to step down:
19This logic is related to the point made by Tucker (2007) that the manner in which electoral fraud leads
to protest is by serving as a focal point for many citizens who are dissatisfied with the government to have
enough confidence that other citizens will simultaneously express their anger at this point in time by taking
to the streets.
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Proposition 2. If there is a unique equilibrium in the protest stage, the incumbent steps
down if and only if the election result is sufficiently low, which happens with positive proba-
bility. The critical election result e∗ is given implicitly by E[ρ|e∗] = 1− yI , where yI denotes
the incumbent’s payoff for stepping down.
Proof See the appendix
Thus the incumbent steps down if and only if the election result is sufficiently low that
the ensuing protests make stepping down more appealing than standing firm. However, the
unique equilibrium case does not capture alternation of power in a manner we would label as
democratic, as the critical election result that determines whether the incumbent steps down
may be completely unrelated to the legal threshold required for victory. In fact, other than
for knife-edge cases, the critical election result won’t correspond to a formal rule. The critical
threshold may happen to fall at a 50% vote share in a given election, but even if so changes
in any of the models parameters – e.g., the cost of protest, or the prior incumbent popularity,
which would surely be different in subsequent elections – will shift this critical threshold away
from the legally codified rule. As a result, we call this pattern “semi-democratic” alternation
of power.
The fact that the incumbent steps down before the protest even begins is somewhat
at odds with our motivating examples of semi-democratic turnover, although we do have
real world examples of incumbents yielding power without being pushed to do so by post-
election protests following elections in non-democratic countries; Poland in 1989 following
the stunning and unexpected Solidarity victory is perhaps the clearest example (Ash, 1999).
Further, in section 7 we will examine an extension where the incumbent can step down before
or after the protest, and in the analogous equilibrium they often will wait until after the
initial protest to step down.
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For an example an example where the incumbent did not step down despite losing by
the official rules consider the 1991 Algerian parliamentary elections. The Islamist Islamic
Salvation Front won more than twice as many votes as any other party in the first round
of these elections. By any democratic standards, the party would have taken control of the
government following the second round of the election. However, the military stepped in
to prevent a change of government and cancelled the second round. By the standards of
our model, the first round of the election would have sent a signal that the incumbent was
popular enough to remain in office, despite the fact that this level of popularity was nowhere
near conventional democratic levels of majority support among the population.20 Thus the
model highlights that winning the election by official rules was not the critical result needed
for a transfer of power, though this may have happened if the Islamic forces has won even
more convincingly.
5 Multiple Equilibria and Electoral Rules
Recall that in solving the model, we first identify the citizens protest strategy for each
election result and then determine whether the incumbent steps down or not as a function
of the election result given this strategy. In the previous section, we analyzed the case
where there is a unique protest strategy for each election result, which renders this process
conceptually (if not algebraically) straightforward. However, there may be more than one
strategy that the citizens can use in the protest stage for some election results: intuitively,
one equilibrium where citizens are prone to protest when they think others are prone to
protest and another equilibrium where citizens are prone to stay home if they think others
are apt to stay home.
20We use the term “majority” loosely here as this was not a presidential election. However, if we think of
the indirect translation of “majority” support in a parliamentary election as being able to win enough seats
to form a government, then the forces supporting the Algerian military clearly were not going to win enough
votes in this election to hold power in the parliament following the election.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 3. The dashed line corresponds to the LHS of equation
2, and the curves to the RHS for various election results.
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To see that such multiplicity is possible, note that the equilibrium protest thresholds
θˆ(e) (from equation 2) are given by the intersection of an increasing line and a normal CDF.
Some tedious algebra gives that the precision of this CDF is a function of the precisions of
the primitive random variables:
τRHS =
τθ(τ0 + τe + τθ)
2τθ + τ0 + τe
(
1 +
τθ
τ0 + τe
)−2
Figure 1 plots this equilibrium condition for various election results for a case when τRHS
is low (left panel) and high (right panel). The dashed line is the LHS of equation 2 and
the solid curves the RHS for various election results, intersections correspond to equilibrium
protest thresholds. In the left panel, the curves are always less steep than the line, meaning
there is always a unique intersection and hence a unique equilibrium. In the right panel,
τRHS is higher, and for the middle curve – corresponding to an intermediate election result
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– there are three intersections and hence three potential equilibria in the protest stage.21
We analyze when there are multiple equilibria in more detail in the following section, but
for now simply note that the patterns described above hold for any parameter choice. Ei-
ther there is a unique equilibrium for all election results, or there is a unique equilibrium for
extreme election results and three equilibria for intermediate election results.22 These poten-
tial equilibria can be ranked in terms of the expected level of protest: when the equilibrium
protest threshold is higher, more citizens will dislike the regime enough to protest (recall
citizens protest when their regime sentiment is below the threshold, so a higher threshold
means more protest). As will be come clear when analyzing the incumbent decision to step
down, we are mostly interested in equilibria with as much or as little protest as possible, and
hence ignore the “middle” equilibrium and focus on the “high” and “low” protest equilibria.23
Formally:
Proposition 3. There are at most three potential equilibrium strategies in the protest stage,
and there are one or three potential equilibrium thresholds with probability 1. When there are
multiple equilibria:
i) The equilibrium with high levels of protests exists if and only if the election result is
sufficiently low.
ii) The equilibrium with low levels of protests exists if and only if the election result is
sufficiently high
iii) Within the highest or lowest protest equilibrium, the comparative statics in proposition
1 hold. For example, the level of protest is decreasing in the election result and the cost of
protest.
21Since the protest stage is only part of the game, we use the phrase “multiple equilibria in the protest
stage” somewhat loosely. A more technically correct formulation is “multiple threshold strategies that can
be a part of an equilibrium in the protest stage for certain election results.”
22There is also a knife-edge election result that results in two equilibria, but by the continuity of this
random variable these election results happen with probability zero.
23Further, equilibria analogous to the middle protest threshold are generally termed unstable in the global
games literature.
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Figure 2: Illustration of decision to step down in unique equilibrium case (left panels) and
multiple equilibrium case (right panels). The bottom panels have a different cost of protest.
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Proof See the appendix.
Parts i and ii can be seen in the right panel of figure 1: for the low election result, there
is only an equilibrium with a high protest threshold and hence a high level of protest, and
for the high election result there is only an equilibrium threshold with a low level of protest.
Stepping Down with Multiple Equilibria
Now that we have a complete description of the potential equilibria in the protest stage,
we can consider all possibilities in the incumbent decision to step down. Figure 2 illustrates
18
the distinction between the incumbent stepping down in the unique equilibrium and multiple
equilibrium cases. In all panels, the curve traces the expected level of protest as a function
of the election result. The incumbent steps down if and only if the curve is above 1 − yI ,
represented by the horizontal line. The left panels show the unique equilibrium case, and the
right panels a similar multiple equilibrium case. For both, there is a higher cost of conflict
in the bottom panel than the top panel.
Starting with the unique equilibrium case, for both costs of conflict there is a unique e∗
such that the incumbent steps down if and only if e < e∗. However, this critical election
threshold is lower when the cost of conflict is higher (bottom panel), indicating the incumbent
stays in office while getting a lower vote share. As discussed above, we would not consider
the unique equilibrium case democratic as the election result that determines who “wins”
the election varies based on the exogenous parameters.
For the multiple equilibrium case, the shaded area indicates the election results for which
there is a high protest equilibrium (upper line) and a low protest equilibrium (lower line).
Since the high protest equilibrium is above 1− yI and the low protest equilibrium is below
1−yI , the incumbent steps down if and only if the citizens play the high protest equilibrium
for the observed election result.24 So, for both costs there exists an equilibrium where the
incumbent steps down if and only if e < e∗1. For the lower cost (top right panel), there is also
an equilibrium where the citizens play the high protest equilibrium and hence the incumbent
steps down if and only if e < e∗2, where e
∗
2 > e
∗
1. In fact, there is an equilibrium of this form
for any e∗ in the shaded area.
This is a key point: any electoral rule that falls in this range can be enforced by equi-
librium behavior. So, if there is a “democratic” rule in this range (e.g., e < .50), then
this rule can be enforced by equilibrium behavior according to our model, even thought our
24If yI is close to 0 or 1 then it is possible that the incumbent does not step down in the face of a high
protest equilibrium or does step down with a low protest equilibrium. This reduces the range of election
results where the incumbent may or may not step down, but does not change the patterns described here.
19
model posit that elections do no more than provide information about incumbent popularity.
Moreover, this rule can remain enforceable even as the cost of conflict and other exogenous
parameters change. The result is equilibrium behavior that mimics rule-based behavior with-
out turning elections into a contract in our model, and therefore a single model that explains
alternations of power in both “non-democratic” and “democratic” systems.
However, note that e∗2 is outside of the shaded range for the higher cost of conflict. So,
if e∗2 corresponds to the electoral law, then in the stylized example in Figure 2, the increase
in the cost of protest going from the top to bottom panel would render this rule no longer
enforceable. This allows the model to capture the fact that if exogenous conditions shift too
much – e..g, the cost of protest increases too dramatically, something we might associate
with a country becoming less democratic – then the apparently “rule-based” democratic
behavior in equilibrium will eventually collapse.
Informative Elections, Polarization, and Consolidated Democracy
Having established the centrality of multiplicity for constructing equilibria where demo-
cratic rules are followed, we now examine in more detail when there are multiple equilibria in
the protest stage. Given the size of the parameter space and complexity of the equilibrium
condition, there are many potential results, all of which require caveats. We focus on two
results that we believe are particularly easy to interpret. More informative elections (high
τe) and a less polarized citizenry (low b) tend to lead to multiple equilibria for some election
results.
A common thread in both results is that there tend to be multiple equilibria when citizens
condition their behavior heavily on whether they expect other citizens to protest. When the
election is uninformative, it is harder to form conjectures about what the election result
means and hence whether other citizens dislike the regime enough to protest, so citizens will
tend to rely more heavily on their personal regime sentiment. Similarly, when polarization
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is high, many citizens care more about the expressive benefit relative to considerations
of whether others are going to take to the streets. So, uninformative elections and high
polarization tend to be associated with a unique equilibrium.
On the other hand, when the election is informative and citizens are not polarized, they
condition their behavior more on their expectations of what others will do. This can result
in multiple equilibria: one with a self-fulfilling expectation that many others will go out and
protest and one with a self-fulfilling expectation that few citizens will protest:
Proposition 4. i) There are multiple equilibria in the protest stage for some election results
if and only if the polarization of citizens is sufficiently low.
ii) Provided there is always a unique equilibrium for a completely uninformative election,
there are multiple equilibria in the protest stage for some election results if and only if the
election is sufficiently informative.
Proof See the appendix.25
These results can be seen visually by referring back to figure 1. Increasing the precision
of the election result increases τRHS, which as shown in the contrast between the right
and left panels makes it more possible to have multiple intersections and hence multiple
equilibria. Similarly, lowering the polarization (b) makes the dashed line flatter, also raising
the possibility of multiple intersections.
One way to interpret part ii is that following a free and fair election, voters can be rela-
tively confident that the announced election result is a good proxy for the actual popularity
of the incumbent. Further, given the public nature of the election result, citizens have a
good conjecture about what other citizens think about the incumbent popularity. The more
norms of free and fair elections are violated, the less likely it is that all citizens will be able
25The appendix also contains some technical caveats related to this result; for example, it is not necessarily
the case that the probability of an election result with multiple equilibria is increasing in the precision of
the election result.
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to come to the same conclusions regarding the underlying popularity of incumbents. It is
this common belief about what the election result means that makes it easier for citizens to
coordinate on either a high level or a low level of protest, enabling them to enforce electoral
rules.
Before turning to the extensions, we briefly address the question of why an equilibrium re-
sembling compliance with a majoritarian electoral rule is particularly appealing equilibrium.
One argument is that following an electoral rule, particularly one at a natural threshold like
a majority vote share is a natural focal point in sense coined by Schelling (1960, ch. 3).
Citizens could threaten to protest against leaders who don’t achieve the electoral threshold
plus five percent, or on any publicly observed “sunspot”, but these simply seem less natural
than coordinating against law breakers. Further, given the fact that protest is costly and
citizens want to protest against unpopular rules but not popular ones, such a rule may be
optimal by putting popular leaders in office peacefully.26
6 Unknown Fraud and Monitoring Reports
Until this point we have assumed that the amount of fraud is known. However, this is
rarely – if ever – the case. Indeed, in many of our motivating examples, attempts to resolve
uncertainty about how much fraud was committed played a key role in the post-election
protests. Further, we have some idea about how citizens come to hold ideas about how much
fraud was committed, namely due to the publication of what we are terming monitoring
reports, by which we mean any public signals about how much fraud was committed. This
could include actual reports issued by election monitors such as the Carter Center or Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but also is intended to be broad enough
to refer to news media reports of fraud, information (such as videos) posted to the internet,
26A full technical analysis of the optimal equilibria quickly becomes complex. Further issues like making
fraud endogenous could complicate this argument, but we leave a thorough analysis of these questions to
future work.
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or reports of parallel vote tabulations.
To take account of these considerations, we make two modifications to the model. First,
we now interpret the “noise” in the election result to reflect uncertainty about how much
fraud was committed. That is, x now represents the average amount of fraud, and x + νe
the “true” amount of fraud.27 Second, in addition to the election signal, citizens now also
observe a monitoring report m, which is a noisy signal of the level of fraud. The monitoring
report is normally distributed with mean x+ νe and precision τm. That is, m = x+ νe + νm
where νm is independent of the other noise terms and normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision τm. I
As in the main model, the joint normality assumptions lead to a convenient character-
ization of the citizens’ interim beliefs about the incumbent popularity, which summarize
the public information citizens have about the incumbent popularity before observing their
private signal. In the baseline model this is normal with a mean that is a weighted average of
the prior mean (µ0) and election result less the expected level of fraud (e−x), and a precision
that is the sum of the precision of the prior and election result. With the monitoring re-
port, this belief is again a weighted average, with an additional correction term that reflects
whether the monitoring report indicates more or less fraud than expected (m − x) and a
higher precision (τ0 + τe + τm). Thus the analysis of the model is essentially the same with
some additional terms added to the beliefs. The main implications of adding the monitoring
report are:
Proposition 5. If there is a unique equilibrium in the protest stage, the level of protest is
increasing in the monitoring report (i.e., as the report claims more fraud), and the incumbent
steps down if and only if the monitoring report claims sufficiently high levels of fraud.28
Just as stronger election results for the incumbent lead to less protest because they in-
27All the results here would hold as long as some of the uncertainty built into the election result comes
from uncertainty about fraud.
28Analogous results can be derived in the multiple equilibrium case.
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dicate the incumbent is popular, reports of more fraud lead to more protest because they
indicate the incumbent is, for a fixed election result, less popular.29 This prediction is con-
sistent with recent empirical work (Hyde and Marinov, 2012; Rozenas, 2012). This extension
is also consistent with a more nuanced result in Rozenas (2012), which finds that the effect
of public reports of fraud on protest is larger when the margin of victory is small. In our
model, the expected level of protest is an backwards (i.e., decreasing) s-shaped curve in the
posterior belief about the incumbent popularity, which is a function of both the election
result and monitoring report. When the election result is very high, and expected protest
low, the posterior belief on the flat part of the s-curve and increasing beliefs about fraud has
little effect on protest. However, for closer elections the posterior belief may be closer to the
sharp part of the s-curve, meaning changes in monitoring reports can have a large impact
on the resulting amount of protest.
Further, a similar result about the relationship between the precision of the election result
and the possibility of multiple equilibria holds for the precision of the monitoring report:
Proposition 6. Provided there is a unique equilibrium without a monitoring report, there
are multiple equilibria for some election results with a monitoring report provided the report
is sufficiently informative.
The reason for this is straightforward given the previous result: one role that the moni-
toring report plays is to make the election result more informative as there is less uncertainty
about the level of fraud. Thus institutions that detect electoral fraud can help consolidate
democracy for a potentially unexpected reason: increasing the amount of public information
and facilitating the coordination dynamics required to make electoral rules enforceable.30
29That is, this is not driven by citizens being angry at cheating incumbents (as in Tucker (2007)).
30 Svolik and Chernykh (2012) make a related argument that information generated by third parties
like international monitors can help peaceful compliance with election results by alleviating information
asymmetries between elites. Our results show that information can also facilitate peaceful transitions of
power by alleviating information problems among the citizenry.
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7 When to Step Down
The main model presented here assumes the incumbent has only one chance to step down,
and that this chance is before the protest. As with any assumption, this is clearly unrealistic:
leaders can concede defeat on the night of the election (as typically happens in democratic
elections) or after days or weeks of protest (as in the Colored Revolutions).
To capture this difference, we extend the model to allow the incumbent to either step
down before or after the protest. As in the main model, if the incumbent steps down right
away, they get a payoff yI ; if they never step down the payoff is 1 − ρ. If they step down
after the protest, they get payoff yI − γρ, where γ ∈ (0, 1). That is, (1) when stepping down
after the protest the incumbent is hurt by the level of protest, but not as much as they are
if they do not step down at all, and (2) it is always better to step down before the protest
than after the protest. Despite the second part, the incumbent will sometimes step down
after the protest because they are unsure of how many citizens will take to the streets, and
hence it can be valuable to wait things out and only step down if the protest is indeed large.
The intuition behind how this modification affects the results is straightforward but
the technical details involved are complex, so we relegate most of the formalization to the
appendix. The first point is that citizen behavior at the protest stage is unaffected, so we
only need to determine the incumbent yielding decisions. As above, the relative payoff from
stepping down immediately diminishes the higher the vote for the incumbent candidate, so
there will be a critical election result such that the incumbent steps down immediately if
e < e∗. If the incumbent does not step down, there will be a critical protest level ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
such that the the incumbent steps down following the protest if and only if ρ > ρ∗.
This pattern result holds regardless of whether or not there are multiple equilibria in
the protest stage. However, there are crucial differences between the cases. In the unique
equilibrium case, the value of standing firm is continuously decreasing in the election result,
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so there will be election results where a moderate level of protest is expected. Further, these
are precisely the election results where the incumbent is uncertain about exactly how big the
protests will be, giving an incentive to wait things out and see how large the protests become.
This is well reflected in elite behavior in semi-democratic (or competitive authoritarian)
regimes, where we have many examples of leaders attempting to hold onto office following a
poor electoral showing that they know is likely to produce a high degree of protest, sometimes
successfully (Iran, Russia) and sometimes unsuccessfully (Ukraine, Serbia).
On the other hand, in the multiple equilibrium case there is a sharp discontinuity in
the payoff to standing firm at the critical election result where the citizens switch from the
high protest to low protest equilibrium. Further, as shown in figure 2, the expected level
of protest tends to be very close to zero or one: meaning nearly none or all of the citizens
will protest based on whether the electoral threshold is reached. So, there is little gain to
waiting and seeing the actual protest size, which will means the incumbent will step down
immediately after “losing” the election based on a codified rule, and faces minimal protest
(and hence almost never steps down) upon winning.
So, there is an important difference between the multiple equilibrium case and unique
equilibrium case in terms of when the incumbent tends to step down. In the multiple
equilibrium case – which we have already argued resembles democratic turnover in office –
the incumbent tends to step down right after the election (upon losing), and large protests
rarely happen. In the unique equilibrium case – which again we label semi-democratic – it
is possible that the incumbent steps down right away, but will also very often not step down
right away in order to see the realized level of protest.
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8 Conclusion
The spread of elections globally is perhaps the most interesting development in compar-
ative politics over the past half-century. Nearly every country on earth now holds elections,
and in the vast majority of cases there is at least the appearance of some competition; that
is, most of these are not Soviet style 99% turnout and 99% incumbent vote share elections.
And yet, as social scientists (and theorists) we tend to still want to dichotomize the electoral
experience into “free” elections and (insert adjective here)31 elections, with the former being
imbued with an almost mythical contractual power that guarantees results will be respected
and the latter treated as a separate animal if not dismissed as meaningless. Somewhat
surprisingly, as a field we lack a general theory of elections. This paper is a step in that
direction.
More specifically, the model presented above provides a general framework to capture
how elections across regime types can facilitate alternation in power. In particular, it shows
that a minimalist assumption about the role of elections – that they are a public signal of the
incumbent popularity – can lead to equilibria that are qualitatively consistent with transfer of
power due to (the threat of) post-election protest as well as peaceful and democratic transfer
of power. This highlights two factors that tend to facilitate the possibility of democratic
transfer of power: citizens that are not too polarized and elections that are informative.
More broadly, the results speak to the value of modeling elections primarily as information
generating institutions. Here we have shown that this allows us to capture a phenomenon that
at first may seem unrelated to information generation: peaceful and rule-based alternation
of power. Further, the universality of this approach may build a bridge between the study
of democratic and less-than-democratic elections.
31E.g., not free and fair, quasi-democratic, semi-democratic, competitive authoritarian, unequal, etc.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium Condition, Proofs, and
Technical Comments
Conditional distributions of ω
Here we derive the posterior belief about ω given e, m, and θj, the other posteriors follow
from a similar calculation. The joint distribution of ω, e, m, and θj is a multivariate normal
with mean vector (µ0, µ0 + x, x, µ0) and covariance matrix:
Σ =

ω e m θj
ω τ−10 τ
−1
0 0 τ
−1
0
e τ−10 τ
−1
0 + τ
−1
e τ
−1
e τ
−1
0
m 0 τ−1e τ
−1
e + τ
−1
m 0
θj τ
−1
0 τ
−1
0 0 τ
−1
0 + τ
2
θ

=
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22

where Σ11 = τ
−1
0 (which uniquely determines the remainder of the partition). So, the desired
posterior is normal (see Greene 2009; p 1014) with mean
µ(e,m, θj) = µ0 + Σ12Σ
−1
22 (e− (µ0 − x),m− x, θj − µ0)
=
τ0µ0 + (τe + τm)(e− x) + τθθj − τm(m− x)
τ0 + τe + τm + τθ
and precision
(Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21)−1/2 = τ0 + τe + τm + τθ.
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Derivation of the Equilibrium Condition
The indifference condition for a citizen with the cutoff level of regime sentiment θj = θˆ(e)
is:
θˆ(e) =
−k1 − c+ k1E[ρ|θˆ(e); θj = θˆ(e)]
b
What remains to be derived is E[ρ|θˆ(e); θj = θˆ(e)]. The probability of receiving a signal
that will lead to protest is Pr(θj < θˆ(e)), so the expected proportion of protesters for as a
function of the true popularity ω and proposed equilibrium threshold is:
E[ρ|ω, θˆ(e)] = Pr(θj < θˆ(e)) = Φ
(
τ
1/2
θ (θˆ(e)− ω)
)
Next we need to derive the belief about ω. Two of these beliefs used below are the mean
interim belief only conditioned on the public information (here, the election result), which
is normal with mean
µ(e) ≡ τ0µ0 + τe(e− x)
τ0 + τe
and precision τ0 + τe. Note that e 7→ µ(e) is an linear function of e, and is invertible except
in the degenerate case when τe = 0. The posterior belief about ω given e and the private
signal θj is normally distributed with mean
µ(e, θj) ≡ (τ0 + τe)µ(e) + τθθj
τ0 + τe + τθ
=
τ0µ0 + τe(e− x) + τθθj
τ0 + τe + τθ
and precision τ0 + τe + τθ.
Let φ(ω;µ, τ) be the probability density function of ω when the belief is normal with
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mean µ and precision τ . Then E[ρ|θj; θˆ(e), e] becomes:
E[ρ|θj; θˆ(e), e] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
τ
1/2
θ (θˆ(e)− ω)
)
φ(ω;µ(e, θj), τ0 + τe + τθ)dω
= Φ
(
τ˜ 1/2(θˆ(e)− µ(e, θj))
)
Where τ˜ = τθ(τ0+τe+τθ)
2τθ+τ0+τe
.32 Evaluating this belief for the marginal citizen (θj = θˆ(e)) and
plugging into the indifference condition gives the equilibrium condition in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1
The expected number of protestors (given the election result e) is
E[ρ|e] =
∫
Φ
(
τ
1/2
θ (θˆ(e)− ω)
)
φ(ω;µ(e), τ0 + τe)dω
= Φ
(
τ 1/2ρ (θˆ(e)− µ(e)
)
where τρ =
τθ(τ0+τe)
τθ+τ0+τe
. This is now in a convenient form for considering comparative statics.
The derivative of the number of protesters with respect to the election result is:
∂E[ρ|·]
∂e
= φ(·)τ−1/2ρ
(
− τ0 + τe
τ0 + τe + τθ
+
∂θˆ
∂e
)
= φ(·)τ−1/2ρ
 τ0 + τe
−τ0 + τe + τθ +
− 1/(k1)
(b/(k1))− φ(·)
(
τ˜ τ0
τ0+τe
)
 < 0
(We suppress the argument of the normal pdf since all that matters for the sign is that it
is positive.) Part iii follows from implicitly differentiating the equilibrium condition with
respect to c and k1, and the fact that the LHS is increasing faster than the RHS at any
intersection corresponding to a stable equilibrium.
32The equality follows from the fact that a normally distributed variable where the mean is unknown and
normally distributed is itself normally distributed.
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Proof of proposition 2
As derived in the main text, the expected level of protest given e is
E[ρ|e] = Φ
(
τ 1/2ρ
(
θˆ(e)− τ0µ0 + τe(e− x)
τ0 + τe
))
From inspection, this expectation is increasing in e. Further, it follows from proposition 1
that lime→∞ E[ρ|e] = 0 and lime→−∞ E[ρ|e] = 1. Since yI ∈ (0, 1), Pr(E[ρ|e] < 1 − yI) ∈
(0, 1). As we can write the equilibrium condition as a function of µ(e), we can write the
expected level of protest as:
E[ρ|µ(e)] = Φ
(
τ 1/2ρ (θˆµ(µ(e))− µ(e)
)
Define µy to be the interim mean belief such that E[ρ|µy] = 1 − yI , hence the incumbent
steps down if and only if µ(e) < µy. Setting e
∗ = µ−1(µy) completes the proof.
Proof of propositions 3-4
To prove these results, write the equilibrium condition as:
α + βθˆ = Φ
(
θˆ − µRHS
σRHS
)
(3)
Where α = c+k1
k1
, β = b
k1
, µRHS = µ(e), and σRHS =
√
τ˜(τ0+τe)
τ0+τe+τθ
. We first present interme-
diate results with this less cumbersome form, and then the results in the main text quickly
follow.
Lemma 1. i. If β > 1/(σRHS), there is a unique θˆ satisfying equation 3.
If β < 1/(σRHS
√
2pi), then there exists µl, µh ∈ R, µl < µh, such that:
ii. If µRHS < µl or µRHS > µh, there is a unique solution to equation 3.
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iii. If µRHS ∈ (µl, µh), there are three solutions to equation 3.
iv. If µRHS = µl or µ = µh there are two solutions to equation 3
Proof Figure 1 in the main text shows the result graphically, a formal proof is available
upon request. If the RHS has a low standard deviation as in the left panel, the maximum
slope will be less than the slope of the LHS, guaranteeing a unique intersection. If the RHS
has a high standard deviation (as in the right panel), there will be multiple intersections if
the steep section of the CDF intersects the LHS from below, which occurs for intermediate
µRHS. Since the first derivative of the RHS of equation 3 is a constant and the derivative
of the LHS is a normal PDF, the difference between the RHS and the LHS can only change
signs twice, which implies there can be no more than three intersections.
Using Lemma 1, we can quickly prove the results in the main text:
Proof of proposition 3.
The number of equilibria follows from the number of intersections derived above, and
the fact that µRHS is exactly equal to µh or µl with probability zero. This also implies that
the “low protest equilibrium” lies lies on the convex part of the RHS (i.e., θˆ < µRHS) and
the “high protest equilibrium” lies on the concave part of the RHS (i.e., θˆ > µRHS). Part
ii and iii then follow from the definition of µRHS and comparing the signs of the derivatives
of the LHS and RHS at the intersections as in the proof of the lemma. Part iv follows
from implicitly differentiating the equilibrium condition and the fact that the LHS must be
increasing faster than the RHS for these equilibria.
Proof of proposition 4. Part i of proposition 4 follows from the fact that β < 1/(σRHS)
is equivalent to b < k1
σRHS
, so there are multiple equilibria for some µRHS if and only this
condition is met. Since any value of µRHS can be met for some e, there will be multiple
equilibria for some election result for b below the critical value. Part ii follows a similar
logic: if σRHS is sufficiently low as τe → 0, there will be multiple equilibria for any τe. If not,
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since σRHS → 0 as τe →∞, there will exist a critical τ ∗e such that the multiple equilibrium
condition is met if and only if τe > τ
∗
e .
Discussion of Proposition 4
We would like to draw attention to several caveats to proposition 4. First, the more
nuanced language in the result about the informativeness of elections is because their may
be multiple equilibria even with a completely uninformative election, hence a precise election
result is not required for the focal point effect. If this is the case, then there can be equilibria
exhibiting the focal point effect even for arbitrarily noisy (i.e., uninformative) election results
Second, it is not necessarily the case that the probability of there being multiple equilibria
is necessarily decreasing in b or increasing in the precision of the monitoring report. So,
it is possible that increasing the precision of the monitoring report makes a high protest
equilibrium less likely for some range of τe.
Finally, it is well known that, both in the global games context and in general, adding re-
alistic components such as giving the incumbent private information or repeating the protest
stage or entire game will often lead to multiple equilibria even if the baseline model has a
unique equilibrium.33 Our only defense against this concern is that all (formal) theories
must make simplifications to clarify potential relationships between “independent” variables
of interest (here, the informativeness of elections and the polarization of the polity) and
outcomes (here, the range of election results with multiple equilibria and hence the possi-
ble of rule-based alternation of power). The potential that other channels through which
the independent variables affect the outcomes may confound, negate, or even reverse the
relationships found in a model is inevitable. We admit it is particularly hard to assess the
magnitude of this problem when dealing with abstract notions such as the pervasiveness of
33Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) and Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2007) consider global games
with signaling and in a repeated setting, respectively. In both cases, these modifications can lead to multiple
equilibria.
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multiple equilibria, but see no concrete reason to worry that including signaling or repeated
game dynamics would change our central results.
Proof of propositions 5-6
The derivations in the appendix show how the equilibrium condition and other results
can be derived with respect to the interim mean popularity µ(e). With the addition of the
monitoring report the interim mean belief is:
µ(e,m) =
τ0µ0 + (τe + τm)(e− x) + τm(m− x)
τ0 + τe + τm
Both are linearly increasing in e and the belief with the monitoring report is linearly
decreasing in m.
Lemma 2. i. We can write the equilibrium threshold rule as the mean interim popularity:
θˆ(µ(e)) or θˆ(µ(e,m)), and
ii. In both the baseline model and extension, all of the results referring to the election result
can be rewritten with respect to the interim mean popularity
Proof Part i follows from doing an analogous derivation of the equilibrium condition when
also accounting for the monitoring report. In particular, the citizen posterior belief about
the incumbent popularity with the monitoring report and their private signal has mean:
µ(e,m, θj) ≡ (τ0 + τe + τm)µ(e,m) + τθθj
τ0 + τe + τm + τθ
=
τ0µ0 + (τe + τm)(e− x)− τm(m− x) + τθθj
τ0 + τe + τm + τθ
and precision τ0 + τe + τm + τθ. This gives an analogous equilibrium condition for θˆ(e,m),
which is decreasing in m in the unique equilibrium case (and the high and low protest
equilibria with multiple equilibria). For part ii, it is clear from definition that µ(e) is an
invertible function of the election result e. So, as long as there is a unique equilibrium for
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all e there will be a unique equilibrium for all µ(e) and a one-to-one correspondence between
these descriptions of the equilibrium threshold.34 So all comparative statics with respect to
e can be equivalently derived with respect to µ(e) in the baseline model and µ(e,m) with
the monitoring report.
The proposition follows from the fact lemma 2 and the fact that µ(e,m) is decreasing in
m.
Stepping Down Before of After Protest
As in the main model, if the incumbent steps down right away they get a payoff yI and if
they never step down the payoff is 1− ρ. If they step down after the protest, they get payoff
yI − γρ, where γ ∈ (0, yI).
The citizen behavior at the protest stage is unaffected by this modification. If I does not
step down immediately, the choice is between yielding and getting payoff yI − γρ and not
stepping down and getting payoff 1− ρ. Rearranging, I steps down if and only if:
ρ >
1− yI
1− γ ≡ ρ
∗ (4)
Now consider the decision to step down or not before the protest stage. The expected
payoff for not stepping down right away is:
uISF (e) = Pr(ρ < ρ
∗|e)(1− E[ρ|ρ < ρ∗, e]) + Pr(ρ > ρ∗|e)(yI − γE[ρ|ρ > ρ∗, e])
For arbitrarily low election results, regardless of the citizen strategy the probability that
there will be a high level of protest becomes arbitrarily large, hence Pr(ρ < ρ∗|e) approaches
34The uniqueness caveat is only necessary because when there are multiple equilibria the mapping from
the election result to equilibrium thresholds is not a function.
35
1 and hence lime→−∞ uISF (e) = y
I − γE[ρ|ρ < ρ∗, e] < yI . So, for sufficiently low election
results, the incumbent steps down right away. Similarly, for arbitrarily high election results
the incumbent knows there will be virtually no protest and hence lime→−∞ uISF (e) = 1 > y
I ,
hence for arbitrarily high election results the incumbent does not step down right away.
Further, as long as equilibrium threshold rule is monotone in the multiple equilibrium
case (i.e., low protest equilibrium if and only if the election result is sufficiently high), the
payoff to standing firm initially is decreasing in the election result. So:
Proposition 7. There exists an e∗SF ∈ R such that the incumbent steps down immediately
after the election if and only if e < e∗SF
Proof This follows from the limiting behavior and the monotonicity of uISF (e) in e.
The following result formalizes the idea that there tends to be more protest on the
equilibrium path in the unique equilibrium case
Proposition 8. When the polarization of citizens is arbitrarily small of the election arbi-
trarily informative,
i) the incumbent always steps down immediately for election results with a high protest equi-
librium, and
ii) the probability of stepping down as a result of protest (after winning an election) ap-
proaches zero.
Proof Part i follows from the fact that as b → 0 and as τe → ∞, E[ρ|e] → 1 and Pr(ρ >
ρ∗) → 1 for any e where the citizens play a high protest equilibrium. Part ii follows from
the fact that as b→ 0 and as τe →∞, E[ρ|e]→ 0 and Pr(ρ > ρ∗)→ 0 for any e where the
citizens play a low protest equilibrium.
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